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Abstract
The paper analyses the relationship between within-country income inequality and policies of 
domestic liberalization and external globalization. The models used to provide the rationale 
for such reforms—such as the Hecksher-Ohlin model—usually predict a decline in inequality. 
However, the evidence shows that inequality often rose with the introduction of such reforms. 
The paper tries to explain this discrepancy by identifying the conditions under which the models’ 
conclusions do not hold. Indeed, such models are based on a simpliﬁ  ed view of reality and 
restrictive assumptions, and their predictions do not necessarily hold in conditions of institutional 
weakness, structural rigidities, inefﬁ  cient markets, asymmetric information and persistent 
protectionism.
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Giovanni Andrea Cornia
Broad trends in income inequality
Domestic income inequality declined steadily between the early nineteenth century and the mid-1970s 
(Bourguignon and Morisson, 2002). Until the 1950s, this decline was mainly evident in today’s advanced 
nations and in the socialist countries of Europe; between the 1950s and early 1970s, however, it spread to 
several developing countries—such as the Asian tigers, China and India—which introduced programmes of 
land reform, educational expansion, public health and income redistribution after achieving independence.
In spite of such declines, income inequality was still very high in most developing countries in the 
1970s, mainly because of the interplay of the ‘traditional causes of inequality’—including high land con-
centration, unequal access to education and other public services, selective access to credit, the dominance 
of the mining or plantation sector, and the urban bias of public policy, which allowed city-based elites to 
capture a disproportionate share of economic opportunities. Racial and gender discrimination were also 
important for inequality, and all this was rooted in social systems in which the poor and the lower-middle 
class had limited ability to organize, inﬂ  uence policy and defend their interests.
From the mid-1970s, income inequality started turning upwards in the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries (Smeeding, 2002) and in Latin America (Székely, 
2003). The 1990s witnessed a sharp rise in income polarization in the economies in transition (Milanovic, 
1998). Meanwhile, in China, inequality rose slowly from 1978 to 1985, after which it rose faster (Riskin, 
2003). A trend reversal also took place in the Asian tigers (Jomo, 2004), India (Deaton and Drèze, 2002) 
and other South Asian nations (Pal, Sengupta and Ghosh, 2004), albeit later, less markedly and from 
lower initial inequality levels. The limited data available for sub-Saharan Africa suggest that, following 
structural adjustment, the urban-rural income gap was reduced by a process of ‘equalizing downward’ (as 
in Côte d’Ivoire), though intra-urban inequality rose, while intrarural inequality rose in countries char-
acterized by high land concentration such as Kenya, or where recovery was peasant-based, but failed to 
reach remote areas, as in Zambia. Meanwhile, income inequality improved in countries characterized by 
a peasant agriculture rebounding from years of civil strife, such as Mozambique and Uganda (McCulloch, 
Baulch and Cherel-Robson, 2000; Bigsten, 2000). Data limitations do not allow any conclusion for the 
Middle East and North African (MENA) region, though the fragmentary evidence available seems to point 
to substantially stable income inequality.
As a result, over the last 25 years, income inequality appears to have risen to various extents and 
with different effects in 70 per cent of the countries with inequality data, representing 80 per cent of the 
world population and gross domestic product (GDP) (Cornia with Kiiski, 2001; Cornia (ed.), 2004).2 
Except for Africa and MENA, these countries accounted for 84 to 98 per cent of the population and for 
1  The following draws on the second half of Cornia (2004).
2  Cornia with Kiiski (2001) carried out an empirical test on the trend changes in income inequality based on 
the November 1998 version of the World Income Inequality Database of the World Institute for Development 
Economics Research (WIDER) using 770 reliable Gini coefﬁ  cients for seventy-three countries (thirty-four 
developing, twenty-three transitional and sixteen OECD countries) accounting for 80 and 91 per cent of the world 
population, and GDP-PPP (purchasing power parity), spanning the period from the mid-1950s to the mid-1990s.2  DESA Working Paper No. 3
82 to 98 per cent of the GDP-PPP of their respective regions. Inequality was found to have risen in 48 
countries, to have remained constant in 16, and to have declined in nine. There were notable exceptions to 
the dominant trend of growing inequality—e.g., France, Germany, Malaysia and Jamaica—but these did 
not reverse the general trend.3
The observed increase in Gini coefﬁ  cients in the 53 (out of the 73 tested) nations exhibiting 
growing inequality was moderate (more than 5 points) or high (5-10 points) in about thirty-ﬁ  ve countries. 
Increases of 10-20 points were recorded in fourteen countries, and increases of more than 20 points in 
three States of the former Soviet Union. While inequality rises of 3-5 points from low initial levels may 
spur economic growth, large increases (as in the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)) or 
moderate increases from already high levels (as in Latin America) probably negatively affect poverty al-
leviation and economic growth.
The recent rise in income inequality cannot be attributed to a worsening of the traditional causes 
of inequality mentioned above. While high land concentration remains a major cause of rural and overall 
inequality, such changes cannot, as a rule, explain income inequality trends over the last two decades. 
Indeed, the weight of agriculture in total output and employment fell everywhere, and highly inequitable 
land rents declined, as a share of both GDP and agricultural output. Likewise, while countries well en-
dowed with mineral resources are known to have high income and asset inequality, this ‘curse of natural 
resources’ hardly explains the increase in inequality over the last two decades, as the ‘rent/GDP ratio’ 
systematically declined in most mining or plantation economies from the late 1970s. Third, the apparent 
‘urban bias’ in a more globalized world (Eastwood and Lipton, 2000) has increased in post-1984 China, 
Thailand and Indonesia, but has declined in Latin America and parts of Africa. Finally, worsening inequal-
ity in education is unlikely to offer a general explanation for the recent deterioration in the distribution 
of income. In fact, while more unequal access to education has contributed to greater income inequality 
during the last two decades in Latin America, this does not seem to have been the case in other regions 
(Checchi, 2004).
The recent rise in inequality could also be due to ‘new non-policy factors’ such as skill-biased 
technical change, shifts in labour market participation, demographic effects and rising migrant remit-
tances. Space limitations do not allow a careful review of these hypotheses. While these factors do affect 
the distribution of income in speciﬁ  c situations, none of them generally explains the deterioration over the 
last twenty years in distinctly different types of countries.
One reason why these explanations are either incomplete or misplaced is the mounting evidence 
that the recent increase in inequality has been associated with a rise in the ‘capital share’ of total income, 
and corresponding falls in the ‘labour share’ and the ‘transfer share’. This shift was caused by the effects of 
liberalization and globalization policies that weakened labour institutions, raised interest rates and interest 
spreads, led to insider privatization as well as rising asset concentration and rents in the ﬁ  nancial and real 
estate sector, reduced progressive redistribution via the budget, and exacerbated regional disparities.
In a number of cases, the rise in capital share was very pronounced. In the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, for instance, the income share of the top one per cent of the popula-
3  Up until 7 or 8 years ago, many analyses (Li, Squire and Zou, 1998) suggested that inequality indices had 
remained relatively stable over time. As noted, this is no longer the prevailing view in the literature, as new 
data and analyses point to a fairly general increase in domestic income inequality.Policy Reform and Income Distribution  3
tion (with 60 per cent from capital income) rose over 1979-2001 from 21 to 34 per cent, suggesting that 
the capital share rose by at least 8 percentage points (Atkinson, 2003). Likewise, in South Africa, the 
share of proﬁ  ts, rents and other property incomes rose from 18 to 30 per cent of total income from 1981 
to 2000. In the case of India, Banerjee and Piketty (2001) show that the share of total income accruing to 
the top one per cent of income earners in the late 1990s increased from 4 per cent to almost 11 per cent. 
Thus, though such data are still fragmentary, the evidence suggests the distribution changes of the last two 
decades might be associated with a shift in factor shares, rising spatial inequality and greater wage dif-
ferentials unexplained by human capital theory. Scattered, but growing, evidence in this regard is available 
for countries as different as Argentina, Canada, Chile, Japan, Mexico, the Russian Federation, Thailand, 
Turkey, United States, Uzbekistan and The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.
Thus, while the traditional causes of inequality still contribute to social polarization, there is 
mounting evidence that—contrary to the predictions of mainstream theory—recent policy changes, associ-
ated with domestic liberalization and globalization, have often been associated with rising income inequal-
ity, as will be explored in greater detail in the next section. Thus, understanding the relationship between 
policy reform and income inequality is essential for any effort at reducing poverty over the medium term, 
as in the case of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This is all the more true in view of the pos-
sible interaction between the old ‘structural’ causes of inequality and the new ‘policy-related’ ones.
This paper reviews the changes in within-country income inequality that have accompanied the 
recent liberalization of the domestic economy and external transactions. It argues that the conclusions of 
standard theory about the ex ante distributive impact of policy reform often collide with a substantial body 
of empirical evidence indicating that inequality rose following liberalization and globalization. Finally, 
the paper explores the causes of the discrepancy between theoretical predictions and observed inequality 
trends for each major policy change by emphasizing the impact on inequality of poorly sequenced mac-
roeconomic policies, incomplete markets, weak institutions, asymmetric information, widespread protec-
tionism and structural rigidities.
External liberalization and inequality
Trade liberalization
The Hecksher-Ohlin (HO) theorem predicts that trade liberalization will lead to greater specialization 
and a rise in national income in all participating countries, following a more rational global allocation of 
production inspired by the principle of comparative advantage. In labour-abundant countries, trade liber-
alization is expected to switch production from inefﬁ  cient capital-intensive import substitutes to efﬁ  cient 
labour-intensive exports. In turn, the Stolper-Samuelson (SS) corollary to the HO theorem posits that such 
shifts will lead to convergence in the prices of goods exchanged and in factor remunerations. Because of 
this, domestic inequality is expected to decline in countries endowed with an abundant labour supply and 
to rise in those with an abundant endowment of capital, as the demand and remuneration for the latter 
(unequally distributed) will increase, while the demand and remuneration for labour (distributed more 
equitably) will fall.
However, the empirical evidence of the impact of trade liberalization on inequality is mixed and 
does not always support the conclusions of HO-SS model. Several studies point to the equalizing effect 
of free trade. In the nineteenth century, trade liberalization raised domestic inequality in rich New World 4  DESA Working Paper No. 3
countries, but reduced it in the poor Old World countries. Likewise, in an analysis of thirty-ﬁ  ve small 
developing countries, Bourguignon and Morisson (1989) conclude that the removal of trade protection in 
manufacturing reduced the income share of the richest 20 per cent of the population and raised that of the 
bottom 60 per cent. Wood (1994) arrives at a similar conclusion for East Asian exporters of labour-inten-
sive manufactured goods.
An equally important body of literature points to the opposite conclusions for a broad range of 
countries. For instance, wage inequality was found to have increased in six out of seven Latin American 
countries that had liberalized trade, as well as in the Philippines and Eastern Europe (Lindert and Wil-
liamson, 2001). An analysis of 38 developing countries for the years 1965-1992 found that trade liberal-
ization beneﬁ  ted the richest 40 per cent, while negatively affecting the bottom 40 per cent, who were hurt 
by greater ﬂ  uctuations in the terms of trade following the opening of the economy (Lundberg and Squire, 
1999). Savvides (1999) showed that the most open developing countries experienced a rise in inequal-
ity between the 1980s and the early 1990s, and a positive correlation between trade protection and the 
income share of the poorest quintile.
How can one explain these conﬂ  icting ﬁ  ndings and the frequent discrepancies between empirical 
results and theoretical predictions? To start with, it must be underscored that the HO-SS theorem holds 
under very restrictive assumptions concerning trade between two countries producing two goods with 
two factors (capital and labour), using the same technology that remains constant over time. The model 
also assumes no economies of scale, efﬁ  cient factor markets (characterized by free factor mobility and 
full employment of all factors), balanced trade and symmetric trade liberalization by all trading partners. 
Yet, in the real world, trade takes place in a multi-country, multi-factor and multi-goods context, in which 
most of the above assumptions do not hold. Indeed, a formal extension of the HO-SS model shows that 
the predicted efﬁ  ciency and equity outcomes may not be obtained if some basic assumptions are relaxed. 
Alternative explanations of why inequality may rise after trade liberalization are provided below.
Changing relative endowments of countries participating 
in multi-country, multi-factor and multi-goods trade
The limitations of the 2x2x2 HO model are most obvious when considering the case of trade among coun-
tries whose relative comparative advantages evolve over time because of changing trade policy decisions 
by some other country. Country A, for instance, may have a comparative advantage in terms of unskilled 
labour in relation to country B, but not to country C, which has yet to liberalize its trade regime. Thus, a 
decision to liberalize exports by the latter may have distributional consequences for A. In particular, the 
prediction that A will experience a reduction in inequality due to greater trade with B is unlikely to be ful-
ﬁ  lled as its labour intensive exports will be displaced by those of C. It may even be the case that because 
of C’s decision to liberalize trade, A will specialize in the production of goods with medium-high skill 
and capital content, with the effect of worsening its wage distribution. This is what happened in the 1990s, 
when entry into the world market of labour-intensive manufactures by several low-wage Asian economies 
affected the exports and comparative advantage of middle-income countries in Latin America, Eastern 
Europe and South-East Asia.
Mexico’s experience from 1985 to 1990 is another well documented case of this type of situation 
(Alarcon and McKinley, 1998). In Chile, Costa Rica and Colombia, increasing openness raised inequal-
ity, owing to the contraction of high-skill import-substituting sectors (replaced by imports from developed Policy Reform and Income Distribution  5
economies), the expansion of the semi-skilled sectors (including agriculture) and the contraction of low-
skill intensive sectors due to rising imports from low-income countries (Wood, 1995).
Liberalization in countries specializing in the export of primary commodities
The primary commodities sector has been subjected to considerable price shocks—because of both sud-
den variations in global demand and the ‘fallacy of composition’ problem caused by the growing number 
of suppliers entering saturated markets. Over the past two decades, these price shocks have reduced the 
trade/GDP ratio in most commodity-producing countries despite liberalization of their trade regimes 
(Birdsall and Hamoudi, 2002). These price collapses reduced their export receipts and import capacity, 
leading to declines in employment and earnings in the import-substituting sector (usually not fully com-
pensated by growth of the export sector) and worsening income distribution.
Trade liberalization in countries with unequal distribution of the abundant factor
The standard HO-SS model also fails in the case of countries exporting primary commodities produced by 
means of an unequally distributed abundant factor. While an increase in land-intensive agricultural exports 
may reduce inequality in countries with egalitarian agrarian structures, it could actually raise inequality in 
countries dominated by latifundia. Due to the labour surplus prevalent in the rural labour market, it is un-
likely that increased demand for agricultural workers will raise the subsistence wage in line with or faster 
than the increased export receipts.
Trade liberalization and the import of skill-enhancing investment goods
One assumption of the HO-SS model is that production technologies utilized by the trading countries are 
not affected by trade itself. Yet, trade liberalization can increase access to previously restricted technolo-
gies or raise imports of capital-intensive investment goods by relaxing foreign exchange constraints. With 
capital-skilled labour complementarities, this ‘skill-enhancing trade’ may increase demand for and wages 
of skilled workers and reduce those of unskilled workers.
Asymmetric trade liberalization and protectionism among trading partners
Another assumption of the basic trade model is that trade liberalization occurs in all trading partners. 
However, in the case of ‘low-tech’ African and Asian exporters, trade liberalization has led to unsatisfac-
tory export growth, not only because of weak domestic conditions, but also because of persistent protec-
tionism in OECD countries. Furthermore, OECD countries have not abandoned the policy—forbidden 
under World Trade Organization rules—of subsidizing entire sectors of agriculture and exporting their 
products at prices below their production costs. Thus, in most cases, unilateral liberalization, combined 
with restrictive trade practices by trading partners, can raise inequality and poverty in low-tech exporters, 
as employment and incomes in the previously protected sectors decline while jobs and wages in the export 
sector stagnate.
Factor immobility
In a liberalized trade regime, it is essential that workers are able to move from the declining import-sub-
stituting sector to the expanding export sector. Yet, structural rigidities and governance problems may 
hamper the reallocation of resources towards the export sector because of restrictions on internal migra-
tion (as in Uzbekistan), lack of infrastructure and/or housing where the tradable sector is located (as in 
some sub-Saharan countries), labour laws limiting the transfer of workers across industries (as in India), 6  DESA Working Paper No. 3
shortage of retraining programmes to reskill the workers made redundant in the formerly protected sector 
(as in transitional economies), lack of social safety nets to assist redundant workers until they ﬁ  nd new 
employment (as in China), narrow credit markets and lack of new investments to absorb labour moving to 
the tradable sector. For these reasons, trade liberalization can lead to a fall in employment and earnings in 
the import-substituting sector without generating a corresponding rise in jobs and wages in the export-ori-
ented sector. The impact on inequality is unclear, while the impact on poverty is unfavourable.
In a detailed study of the impact of trade liberalization in India, Topalova (2004) found that rural 
districts with the highest density of industries exposed to liberalization experienced the sharpest increase 
in the incidence of poverty owing to limited factor mobility across regions and industries. Topalova sug-
gests that the impact of trade liberalization was particularly pronounced in the Indian States where rigid 
labour laws hampered the reallocation of labour across industries. However, the limited spatial mobility 
of rural labourers most adversely affected by liberalization suggests that other factors stand in the way of 
effective factor mobility.
Trade reorientation following capital account liberalization
The interaction between trade and capital account liberalization is another explanation that has received 
little attention. Sudden inﬂ  ows of foreign capital can result in the appreciation and increasing instability 
of the exchange rate, shifting the composition of domestic demand towards cheap imports and away from 
domestic products, while rendering exports less competitive (Taylor, 2000). All this leads to the cancelling 
out the supposed positive effects of trade liberalization, as it encourages the restructuring of production 
via a reduction in formal employment and wages and greater reliance on outsourcing, i.e., measures that 
reduce the absorption of unskilled labour and increase wage inequality.
Liberalization of foreign direct investment
The predictions of economic theory about the distributive impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) are 
similar to those of international trade. In low-wage labour-abundant countries, ‘greenﬁ  eld FDI’ accelerates 
capital accumulation and raises the demand for and (under certain conditions) the wage rate of unskilled 
workers. FDI may also offer better employment conditions and higher wages to all workers, regardless 
of their skill level, than the informal or even formal domestic sectors. The distributive impact of ‘brown-
ﬁ  eld FDI’ is less straightforward, as the possible long-term gains in efﬁ  ciency have to be weighed against 
short-term retrenchments in employment that may cause an adverse distributive impact.
Evaluations of wages and employment conditions in ﬁ  rms controlled by transnational corpora-
tions (TNCs) and export processing zones provide mixed results about the impact of FDI. Te Velde and 
Morrissey (2002) found that FDI raised wages of different skill levels in four of the ﬁ  ve East Asian coun-
tries analysed. In Mexico, in contrast, the increase in wages due to FDI was signiﬁ  cantly lower for the 
unskilled than for the skilled workers (Alarcon and McKinley, 1996).
Sectoral composition of FDI
The theoretical advantages of FDI are most often observed in labour-intensive manufacturing branches 
such as textile, apparel, food processing, furniture, toys, beverages and assembly operations but are less 
evident in capital-intensive manufacturing and in the utility and mining sectors. In the latter sectors, pro-
duction requires a lot of capital, little unskilled labour and some skilled workers. This reduces the demand Policy Reform and Income Distribution  7
for and wages of unskilled labour. In the resource sector, the volatility of commodity prices and employ-
ment conditions reduces the incentives to invest in education, negatively affecting the long-term distribu-
tion of income. Income inequality in the mining sector is usually very high as the ownership of mines is 
typically highly concentrated, with mining rents captured by the élite without much effort.
FDI in these sectors is, therefore, likely to raise inequality, through both the labour market and 
political economy mechanisms. In addition, when FDI involves mergers-and-acquisitions, the immedi-
ate effect is labour shedding following ﬁ  rm restructuring and consolidations among ﬁ  rms, with probable 
net job losses (Baldwin, 1995). While this might improve the microeconomic efﬁ  ciency of ﬁ  rms over the 
medium term, the immediate effect is likely to be inequitable.
The overall distributive effect of FDI thus depends on its composition. Evidence shows that while 
the ratio of the combined stock of FDI rose from 19.2 per cent of world GDP in 1990 to 34.0 per cent in 
2000, the sectoral composition of new FDI has shifted towards utilities, ﬁ  nance and trade-related services 
and away from mining and manufacturing. A big share of FDI is increasingly taking the shape of cross-
border mergers and acquisitions, rather than greenﬁ  eld projects—a trend that merely entails the transfer of 
existing jobs from domestic to foreign owners.
Substitution effect and ‘business stealing’
Even when greenﬁ  eld FDI is directed to the labour-intensive sector, its net effect on employment and 
income distribution has to take into account its various impacts on the local economy. This is especially 
important when output is sold on local markets that used to be supplied by domestic ﬁ  rms, which face the 
risk of being displaced by FDI, leading to job losses in the labour-intensive informal sector. As the latter 
is likely to have lower labour productivity and higher employment coefﬁ  cients per unit of output than 
foreign ﬁ  rms, a full displacement of their output tends to worsen the distribution of income.
North-south plant relocation and skill-biased technical change
A further reﬁ  nement of the basic model involves the technology that a multinational seeking lower wages 
is likely to transfer to a developing country. While such technology may be considered to be of low-skill 
intensity for an advanced nation, it might be relatively skill-intensive in a developing country hosting 
the FDI. For instance, the outsourcing of production from the United States to the maquiladora sector 
in Mexico raised demand for unskilled labour in the United States (and so contributed to the rise in the 
skilled/unskilled wage gap) and simultaneously increased demand for what is considered skilled labour in 
Mexico, thus raising wage and overall income inequality in both countries (Feenstra and Hanson, 1997). 
New evidence from China and India suggests that FDI is becoming increasingly skill-biased in countries 
well endowed with cheap, literate and well trained labour.
Regional distribution of FDI and spatial inequality
One of the possible adverse effects of FDI is the increase in spatial inequality. This depends on the indus-
trial policy of the host country that often tries to locate the FDI in more developed and accessible areas. 
In China, for instance, the FDI policy pursued by the local authorities between 1978 and the mid-1980s 
deliberately favoured the southern coastal provinces by granting special tax and duty exemptions besides 
relaxing labour laws. Such FDI-preferential policies were extended to the whole of China only after 1992. 
However, foreign investors continue to enjoy greater incentives in the coastal areas. For instance, the aver-8  DESA Working Paper No. 3
age ‘preferential policy index’—computed by Demurger and others (2002) for 1996-1999—was 3.0 for 
the three main metropolises, 2.4 for typical coastal areas and only 1.3 for the central and north-western 
provinces. In many cases, however, the spatially inequitable effects of FDI may have been largely endog-
enous, as foreign investments are attracted by economies of scope and agglomeration as well as externali-
ties existing in comparatively advanced areas. There is evidence that FDI naturally ﬂ  ows to areas well 
endowed with public infrastructure, transport facilities and industrial services, despite higher wages.
Systemic effects in a world of mobile capital and immobile labour
The mobility of capital and immobility of labour may generate strong competition among developing 
countries simultaneously attempting to attract FDI. These countries may thus engage in a ‘race to the bot-
tom’, in which all of them make concessions to the multinational companies in terms of taxation, sub-
sidies, labour and social security legislation, minimum wages and so on that may affect the distribution 
of private/public consumption and the welfare of workers. While wages in the multinational sector tend 
to be higher than in local ﬁ  rms, these wage and employment beneﬁ  ts may only be felt by the employees 
concerned. In the countries bypassed by FDI, the ex-ante concessions made to attract them may generate 
temporary or permanent costs unmatched by beneﬁ  ts.
Capital account liberalization
Mainstream theory maintains that capital account liberalization raises investment, employment, labour 
productivity and growth in countries with low capital accumulation, but with high rates of return on 
investments and an abundant supply of cheap labour. This raises employment and—possibly—wages in 
countries receiving these funds, with favourable effects for equity. In addition, the liberalization of port-
folio ﬂ  ows permits the diversiﬁ  cation of the ﬁ  nancial assets of domestic investors, leading to a balancing 
of the risk proﬁ  le of their portfolios, thus favourably affecting the national savings rate. Finally, capital 
account opening is supposed to exert a ‘disciplining effect’ on domestic policies in the ﬁ  scal and monetary 
areas, contributing to macroeconomic stability and credibility. Yet, empirical evidence points to wide-
spread deterioration in income inequality following both inﬂ  ows and outﬂ  ows of funds, as documented for 
a large number of episodes in the 1990s. Possible explanations for this discrepancy include:
Appreciation of the real exchange rate due to large inﬂ  ows
Large inﬂ  ows of funds relative to domestic assets generally cause appreciation of the real exchange rate 
that reduces employment in the tradable sector, shifts resources from the tradable to the non-tradable sec-
tor and encourages subcontracting and wage cuts in the tradable sector to preserve or raise proﬁ  t margins 
(Taylor, 2000). Countries can attempt to control exchange rate appreciation via costly sterilization of 
inﬂ  ows or regulation, but both measures only work up to a point.
Intersectoral allocation of portfolio ﬂ  ows
Portfolio ﬂ  ows do not directly beneﬁ  t the poor, as they tend to be invested in ﬁ  nance, insurance and real 
estate (FIRE) activities that have high short-term rates of return and a perceived low risk proﬁ  le, while 
employing medium-to-highly skilled workers whose wages rise together with the skilled/unskilled wage 
differential. In addition, the credit boom associated with the inﬂ  ow hardly reduces credit market seg-
mentation between those who can collateralize their loans and those who cannot, for lack of guarantees. 
During ﬁ  nancial crises, credit allocation becomes particularly skewed as de-capitalized banks may reduce 
their lending and restrict allocation to preferred borrowers (large ﬁ  rms, for example). Given the prolifera-Policy Reform and Income Distribution  9
tion and greater labour-intensity of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in developing economies, 
such ‘credit starvation’ can have serious poverty and inequality consequences.
Sudden capital outﬂ  ows and ﬁ  nancial instability
Capital account liberalization also increases the frequency of destabilizing ﬁ  nancial crises with real ef-
fects. Left to themselves, deregulated ﬁ  nancial systems do not perform well, owing to incomplete in-
formation, markets and contracts, herd behaviour, panics, weak supervision and asset price speculation. 
Indeed, as noted in a recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) paper (Prasad and others, 2003), there 
is no evidence that international capital ﬂ  ows accelerate the rate of growth in recipient countries, while 
there is clear evidence that they raise the instability of private consumption, with clear short and long term 
effects on poverty, as people in developing countries have poorer access to ﬁ  nancial markets and cannot 
smoothen their consumption streams over time.
The empirical evidence suggests that the distributional impacts of ﬁ  nancial crises have generally 
been negative, particularly in countries with weak labour institutions and social safety nets. Galbraith and 
Lu (1999) found that ﬁ  nancial crises raised inequality in 73 per cent of cases in Latin America and 62 per 
cent of cases in Asia, while no impact was evident in Finland, Norway and Spain. Similarly, Diwan (1999) 
found that the share of labour income contracted markedly and irreversibly in the wake of ﬁ  nancial crises. 
Some analyses have shown that during the ﬁ  rst phase of such crises, income inequality may fall as the 
comparatively better paid workers of the FIRE sector are the ﬁ  rst to be affected. However, the medium-
term impact on inequality—transmitted by way of differential employment, wage and price effects—af-
fects the lower deciles especially hard (Levinshon, Berry and Friedman, 1999).
Bailouts of the banking system
Large ﬁ  nancial crises induce a medium-term worsening of inequality because of the huge costs of their 
resolution through recapitalization of the banking sector, bailouts for depositors and debt relief for bor-
rowers with public money, new taxes or foregone progressive expenditures, i.e., measures that entail 
redistribution from the poor to the rich in the ﬁ  nancial sector. The average cost of bailouts in emerging 
economies was 14.7 per cent of the GDP of the countries affected (Halac and Schmuckler, 2003). In ad-
dition, only a few privileged participants received most of these transfers, particularly large, foreign and 
more informed depositors as well as borrowers. The transfers go from poorer to richer households, with 
clearly inequitable effects.
Limited migrant ﬂ  ow liberalization
One irony of policy reform over the last two decades has been the limited liberalization of migrant ﬂ  ows 
between developing and transitional countries on the one hand and developed countries on the other. 
While migration in the period from 1870-1914 was largely state-sponsored, controlled and assisted, the 
same cannot be said of migration today, with restricted legal immigration and growing illegal and semi-
legal immigration. Illegal migration is inefﬁ  cient as it imposes large costs on migrants, enriches organized 
crime, increases expenditure for repression and deportation, and depresses the wages of illegal migrants. 
A more open migration policy would reduce income inequality among countries and—under certain con-
ditions—within countries.10  DESA Working Paper No. 3
The efﬁ  ciency and equity gains deriving from the current migration policy differ considerably 
from those observed from 1870 to 1914. During that period, sixty million mostly unskilled people mi-
grated from the European periphery to the New World. The inequality impact of such migration broadly 
conformed to the predictions of standard theory. The wage and income gap between the countries of the 
Old and New World were substantially reduced, as globalization increased the relative demand for and 
the remuneration of the abundant factors and reduced those of the scarce factors. Mass migration from the 
periphery of Europe to the New World explained most (some 80 per cent) of the drop in the New World-
Old World wage gap between 1870 and 1914 (Williamson, 1996; Andersen, 1999).
Globalization also caused a rise in within-country inequality in the rich countries of the New 
World and a fall in the poor ones of the Old World (Anderson, 1999). In the United Kingdom, Ireland 
and Sweden, the ratio of unskilled wages to farm rents per acre rose following a drop in the supply of 
unskilled labour due to migration, growing labour demand in the export-led manufacturing sector and a 
fall in the prices of agricultural products due to cheap imports. The opposite effects were observed in the 
New World. While migration drove up unskilled wages and drove down the rental-wage ratio in the Old 
World, they caused the opposite effect in the New World. In addition, as migrants were mostly unskilled, 
migration caused a reduction in the skilled-unskilled wage differential in the Old World, but raised the 
same ratio in the New World. In turn, the ﬂ  ow of European investments to the New World partially offset 
the local fall in unskilled wages, as they moderated the decline in returns to a growing supply of unskilled 
labour, and so retarded the rise in wage inequality, while having the opposite effects in the Old World 
countries that exported capital.
Domestic liberalization and inequality
Domestic ﬁ  nancial liberalization
Domestic ﬁ  nancial liberalization inspired by the ‘ﬁ  nancial de-repression hypothesis’ was one of the ﬁ  rst 
policies to be introduced in developing countries from the mid- to late 1970s on. The theoretical argu-
ments in support of this policy are that it leads to ﬁ  nancial deepening, greater competition, private credit 
expansion and the creation of bond and stock markets, i.e., measures that raise the savings, investment 
and employment rates by increasing ﬁ  nancial intermediation, with likely positive effects on the distribu-
tion of income. Yet, the empirical evidence points to favourable effects in the OECD and a few developing 
countries but to negative ones in most low-income nations. How can this contradiction between theory 
and empirical evidence be explained?
Policy sequencing problems; 
Financial liberalization in the presence of large budget deﬁ  cits
In many cases, ﬁ  nancial deregulation was introduced in the presence of large budget deﬁ  cits that could 
no longer be ﬁ  nanced by forcing commercial banks to absorb government debt at artiﬁ  cially low interest 
rates. To ﬁ  nance their deﬁ  cit, governments were obliged to create domestic bond markets in which to sell 
large amounts of treasury bills. Because of the lack of credibility and the considerable volume of bond 
issues, interest rates often rose markedly in both nominal and real terms, with the increase being quickly 
transmitted to the rest of the ﬁ  nancial sector. This shifted the distribution of income in favour of lenders, 
who generally belonged to high income groups, and against borrowers, who belonged to the low-to-me-
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Failure to create competition in the domestic ﬁ  nancial sector
Contrary to expectations, liberalization and privatization failed—especially in the 1980s—to increase 
competition in the ﬁ  nancial sector. While the balance sheets of banks improved, the industry was trans-
formed from a public to a private oligopoly in most cases, as signalled by highly inequitable rises in real 
rates and spreads after liberalization. Even the entry of foreign banks did not raise competition, as these 
banks concentrated on the few low-risk customers while neglecting most potential small borrowers. All 
this meant that the actual credit expansion was much lower than expected, and that the poor continued to 
be excluded from the formal credit market.
Weak regulatory capacity, ﬁ  nancial instability and mounting banking crises
Financial liberalization was introduced without prior strengthening of the regulatory and supervisory 
capacities of the central bank and other public institutions. In several cases, the requirements for opening 
new banks were relaxed. In Latvia, a bank could be established in the early 1990s with only US$20,000. 
In Nigeria, domestic ﬁ  nancial liberalization coincided with the resignation of some central bank staff who 
moved to the private sector to open new—and difﬁ  cult to regulate—non-bank ﬁ  nancial institutions. In 
sum, ﬁ  nancial deregulation led to a highly inequitable increase in ﬁ  nancial instability in many cases, as 
reﬂ  ected by the rise in the frequency and severity of ﬁ  nancial crises in recent years.
Discrimination against SMEs
While repressed ﬁ  nancial systems may have allocated credit highly inefﬁ  ciently, the distributive effects of 
ﬁ  nancial liberalization were often regressive, e.g., with the elimination of directed (and often subsidized) 
credit to small and medium-sized enterprises and to agriculture. The typically anti-rural bias of these re-
forms and risk-minimization by bank branches reduced the volume of credit to the agricultural sector. For 
instance, ﬁ  nancial reforms in China lowered the number of rural credit cooperatives from over 58,000 in 
1995 to 41,000 in 2001 (Pal, Sengupta and Ghosh, 2004). In India, ﬁ  nancial liberalization eased the lending 
norms requiring national banks to assign a certain share of total credit to agriculture and to SMEs. As a 
result, most banks avoided lending to small farmers and small industries perceived to be less creditworthy, 
though evidence shows that this perception was groundless (Pal, Sengupta and Ghosh, 2004). The resulting 
credit crunch deprived the relatively poor of credit for investing in their business. Except in countries with 
vibrant private credit markets, the closure of rural bank branches and abolition of dedicated credit lines 
forced small entrepreneurs and peasants into the clutches of often usurious informal moneylenders.
United States high interest rate policy
In many countries, the ﬁ  nancial sector was deregulated between 1982 and 1993, i.e., a period during 
which the United States Federal Reserve followed a policy of high interest rates. Such liberalization and 
the IMF demand for large increases in interest rates in adjusting countries fuelled a worldwide rise in real 
interest rates to well above the secular trend of 2 to 3 per cent. As a result, several governments entered 
a vicious circle in which rate increases augmented the cost of debt servicing, which further pushed the 
budget deﬁ  cit and indebtedness level upwards. In a number of middle-income and industrialized countries 
with large stocks of debt, this policy raised the cost of public debt servicing to almost 15 per cent of GDP 
(UNCTAD, 1997). The net effect of all of this was regressive, as tax incidence is broadly proportional, 
while ownership of ﬁ  nancial assets is highly concentrated in developing countries. Thus, ﬁ  nancial deregu-
lation appears to have raised the rate of return to ﬁ  nancial assets and the share of GDP accruing to non-
wage incomes, and to have redistributed labour income to holders of state bonds via the budget.12  DESA Working Paper No. 3
Labour market liberalization
Neoclassical labour theory suggests that the liberalization of wage formation is likely to raise both em-
ployment (as enterprises are more willing to hire workers at lower wages) and wage dispersion (as work-
ers with more human capital receive higher wages than in the past). The net distributive impact of these 
mutually offsetting effects is indeterminate as it depends on their relative signiﬁ  cance. A second predic-
tion of neoclassical theory applied to dualistic labour markets is that the abolition of minimum wage and 
other regulations in the formal sector raises employment and reduces the formal-informal sector wage 
gap, a beneﬁ  cial outcome in countries with a small labour élite employed in a capital-intensive sector and 
a large low-wage informal sector.
Yet, with the exception of some East Asian countries, evidence over the last two decades points to 
an excess of negative over positive effects. For instance, liberalization of the labour market in Latin Amer-
ica was accompanied by slow employment creation, growing informalization, an erosion of minimum 
wages and greater overall wage inequality. Behrman, Birdsall and Székely (2000), for instance, show that 
wage differentials rose in 18 Latin American countries after liberalization of the labour market. Similar 
patterns were observed in some OECD and transitional countries and, lately, in the Republic of Korea, a 
recent OECD member. In Eastern Europe, the fall of minimum wages relative to the average wage cor-
related closely with the rise in earnings inequality (Cornia, 1996). In contrast, earnings concentration did 
not increase in a few OECD and other countries that have preserved collective bargaining institutions and 
adequate minimum wage levels. Some possible explanations for this gap between theory and trends fol-
low.
Adverse effects of changes in labour institutions
The abolition of minimum wages might not stimulate labour demand, as the labour demand curve can be 
inelastic in a particular range, while the wage decline increases poverty and inequality. While weaken-
ing trade unions may reduce labour market rigidities, a low rate of unionization may also adversely affect 
social cohesion, incentives and industrial relations.
Erosion of the ‘reference norm’ and the rise of the P90/P10 ratio
Mounting wage inequality following liberalization was also found to be associated with a rapid surge 
in the highest wages, rather than with falls in the bottom wages, a fact unexplained by human capital 
theory, but possibly related to the expansion of the ﬁ  nance, insurance and real estate (FIRE) sectors and 
to changes in social norms for the remuneration of highly skilled people. For instance, recent increases in 
wage inequality in the United States and the United Kingdom might be explained by the spread of ‘winner 
takes all’ remuneration packages for top professionals and greater recourse to stock options for executive 
compensation.
Labour market liberalization with open trade and capital accounts
In Latin America and the former Soviet bloc, the liberalization of labour markets coincided with the open-
ing up of foreign trade and capital movements. As noted earlier, these changes on the export front led to 
wage compression and the shift of labour, either to the high-wage non-tradable FIRE sector or to low-
wage informal subcontracting, increasing wage inequality.Policy Reform and Income Distribution  13
Tax reforms
Tax reforms have been introduced over the last two decades to reduce trade taxes, in order to promote a 
more efﬁ  cient international allocation of resources and to simplify unnecessarily complex and inefﬁ  cient 
tax regimes characterized by a large number of taxes, deductions and exemptions. In addition, the pro-
gressiveness of wealth and other direct tax rates was reduced to minimize ‘efﬁ  ciency costs’ (i.e., reduced 
labour supply due to high tax rates) and stimulate supply responses. At the same time, greater emphasis 
was placed on ‘horizontal equity’ (i.e., loss of equity and revenue due to numerous tax exemptions and 
evasion) by eliminating exemptions and improving collection. Under this new regime, the loss of rev-
enue—caused by the elimination of trade taxes and the reduction in direct taxes on corporations—was to 
be compensated for by broadening the tax base through the reduction of exemptions and the introduction 
of value-added tax (VAT).
Although the impact of these reforms varied from country to country, the general trend has been 
towards lower yields and more regressiveness. In an analysis of whether tax changes contributed to the rise 
in income inequality over the previous ﬁ  fteen years, Atkinson (2000) notes that the direct tax schedule be-
came less progressive in all six OECD countries, although this was offset in part by broadening the tax base 
in three of them. A comprehensive study of tax reforms since the mid-1970s for developing countries by 
Chu, Davoodi and Gupta (2000) points to an average drop of one percentage point in the tax/GDP ratio be-
tween the 1980s and the 1990s (as opposed to a rise of 1.6 percentage points between the 1970s and 1980s) 
and a decline in the share of direct taxes and a fall in overall tax progressiveness, all of which correlate with 
rising inequality. In Latin America, Morley (2000) notes that tax changes shifted the burden of taxation 
away from the wealthy to the middle and lower classes. Similar evidence is available for Pakistan, where 
following tax reform, the tax burden on the poor increased by 7.4 per cent between 1987-1998 and 1997-
1998, while the burden on the richest households declined by 15.9 per cent (Pal, Sengupta and Ghosh, 
2004). What explains these trends that at least partly contradict the predictions of the tax theory summa-
rized above? No detailed analysis is available, but the following hypotheses can be plausibly advanced:
Elimination of trade taxes
In many countries, trade liberalization led to considerable losses in comparatively easy-to-collect import 
duties and export taxes. In most cases, the decline in revenue from trade taxes was not compensated for 
by increased revenue generation from other taxes. In India, the reduction of import duties following trade 
liberalization led to a permanent reduction of the revenue/GDP ratio by almost two percentage points. The 
revenue decline was compensated for by reducing subsidies on agricultural inputs, rural credit and food 
subsidies.
Limited impact of tax broadening
The broadening of the tax base (via reduced exemptions and greater efforts in tax collection) had limited 
effects in terms of revenue generation and horizontal equity, possibly because of institutional weaknesses 
and political economic factors. In these circumstances, the expected negative effect of the reduced pro-
gressiveness of direct taxation prevailed.
Dominance of non-graduated VAT
In many countries, indirect taxes now generate the greatest share of total revenue. When applied at a uni-
ﬁ  ed rate to all transactions, such taxes are regressive in impact, while lower indirect tax rates for inferior 14  DESA Working Paper No. 3
goods may help preserve the progressiveness of the tax structure. However, the differential rates approach 
was seldom applied.
Overall impact of the liberalization-globalization package
Mainstream theory claims that the overall policy reform package—made up of policy components gener-
ally expected to have progressive effects—will have a progressive impact on inequality. However, the few 
available studies on the impact of the packages provide a different picture. In an analysis of eighteen Latin 
American countries during the period from 1980 to 1998, Behrman, Birdsall and Székely (2000) found 
that the reform packages signiﬁ  cantly increased wage differentials in the short term, though this regres-
sive effect declined over time. They also found that the strongest impacts were due to domestic ﬁ  nancial 
reform, capital account liberalization and tax reform. On balance, trade openness had no effect on the 
wage spread.
Székely (2003), who analysed the impact of policy reform on inequality in nineteen Latin Ameri-
can countries over the period 1977-2000, found that while trade reform did not affect the income share of 
the bottom three deciles, ﬁ  nancial liberalization reduced them signiﬁ  cantly. Taxation, labour market and 
privatization reforms did not appear to impact the income share of the poor. For Székely, the inequitable 
impact of ﬁ  nancial and other liberalizations was clear, while greater trade openness appeared to reduce 
inequality.
In a review of twenty-one reform episodes in eighteen countries during the previous two decades 
(Taylor, 2000), income inequality was found to have risen in thirteen cases, remained constant in six and 
improved in two. Virtually without exception, wage differentials by skill level rose following trade and 
ﬁ  nancial liberalization as a result of the reduction of modern sector employment, rises in productivity and 
wage concentration by skill within the modern sector, reallocation of excess labour to the low-paying non-
tradable sector (informal services and traditional agriculture) and greater inequality within the non-trad-
able sector. Looking at the impact of liberalization in thirty-two developing and transitional economies for 
1980-1995, Cornia with Kiiski (2001) found that while the reform packages had regressive effects overall, 
the effect was more pronounced in the economies of the former Soviet bloc than in countries with high 
initial levels of inequality.
Although the above studies do not trace the causal linkages between liberalization and globaliza-
tion on the one hand and income distribution on the other, the limited evidence reviewed above and other 
evidence (e.g., Atkinson and Brandolini, 2003) suggest that the overall liberalization package may lead to 
increased domestic income inequality, especially in economies with weak domestic institutions. Among 
the factors contributing to this increase are the incomplete switching of resources from the non-tradable 
to the tradable sector, leading to a fall in modern-sector employment, rising wage differentials within the 
modern sector, bloating of the informal sector, a lower wage share and a higher capital share linked to in-
creasing banking and ﬁ  nancial instability as well as labour market and tax changes. Of the six components 
of the liberalization package, capital account liberalization appears to have the strongest regressive effect, 
followed by domestic ﬁ  nancial liberalization, labour market deregulation and tax reform. The equity ef-
fects of privatization and trade liberalization appear to vary, with progressive effects in some countries 
and regressive ones in others.Policy Reform and Income Distribution  15
Conclusion
The theoretical models used to promote neoliberal policy reforms are often unable to predict the inequal-
ity impact of internal and external liberalization, as they are based on simplistic and highly restrictive as-
sumptions that do not take into account the complexity of the impact of institutional weaknesses, structur-
al rigidities, incomplete markets, asymmetric information, persistent protectionism and the liberalization 
of trade, ﬁ  nance and labour markets in the real world.
Thus, while some neo-liberal policies can generate positive effects in countries with strong 
markets and institutions, favourably placed in world markets, and beneﬁ  ting from FDI in labour-intensive 
manufacturing and egalitarian privatization, their premature and poorly-sequenced implementation under 
conditions of asymmetric trade liberalization, incomplete markets, weak institutions, structural rigidities 
and a dependent position on the world market may generate adverse distributive and growth outcomes. 
Under these conditions, developing countries should adopt a ﬂ  exible policy approach and seek greater 
policy space to experiment with different more gradualist approaches. This requires that the costs and 
beneﬁ  ts of a policy proposal be assessed in advance and that liberal reforms be postponed in toto or in 
part until domestic and international conditions ensure reasonable success in implementing them. In some 
cases, more time may be required to attend to existing problems before liberalization should proceed.
Even under more favourable conditions, developing countries should postpone sine die the 
liberalization of portfolio ﬂ  ows and reconsider the dominant approach to tax reform, as both policies 
tend to generate regressive effects, and should therefore be avoided rather than postponed. Finally, the 
international community should vigorously pursue policies ignored in the neo-liberal package in order 
to improve the distribution of income in both developing and developed countries. Such policies include 
lessening restrictions on ‘regulated migration’, stronger global macroeconomic coordination among the 
major countries to stabilize exchange rates among the principal currencies, and establishment of inter-
national safety nets to assist ‘innocent bystander’ countries that have to deal with the negative effects of 
international ﬁ  nancial crises.16  DESA Working Paper No. 3
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